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The Americans with Disabilities Act and Inmates with 
Disabilities: The Extent to Which Title II of the Act 
Provides a Recourse 
Paul Evans* 
Serving a prison term is a punishment to be dreaded for any 
American, but it can be far more dreadful for a person with a 
disability.1 In the United States today, there are over two million 
incarcerated individuals, of whom a substantial number suffer from a 
physical or mental disability.2 Certainly, every individual will face 
 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. 
 1. The definition of “disability” that is relevant to this article is contained in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (2005) 
(codified in scattered sections of 27 and 42 U.S.C.). “In this Act, the term ‘disability’ means, 
with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2005). 
 The word “inmate” must also be defined. This article will refer to inmates as persons 
incarcerated in local, state, and federal facilities. Most often, the word “inmate” will refer to 
people with disabilities incarcerated in state-run prisons. However, local facilities may also be 
discussed, because “there is substantial overlap and shared use of correctional facilities by state 
and local governments.” Brief of Petitioner at 18 n.9, United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 
S. Ct. 877 (2006) (Nos. 04-1203, 04-1236), 2005 WL 1811401. 
 For an example of the issues faced by an inmate with a disability, see LaFaut v. Smith, 834 
F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987). In this case an inmate whose legs were amputated below the knees 
was forced to drag himself across the floor of his cell to use the toilet because the space 
between the toilet and the wall was too narrow for the inmate to maneuver his wheelchair. Id. at 
392. In addition, the opening in the seat was too wide for his atrophied leg muscles and narrow 
buttocks, and there was no bar for him to steady himself, so he often slipped into the toilet 
water or fell on the ground. Id. Due to these problems the inmate resorted to using a catheter, 
but contracted a kidney infection as a result. Id. 
 2. See LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181644, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF INMATES, 1997 (2001). This report 
estimated that 31% of state inmates and 23% of federal inmates have a “learning or speech 
disability, a hearing or vision problem, or a mental or physical condition.” Id. at 1. In addition, 
21% of state inmates and 22% of federal inmates acquired a medical problem after becoming 
incarcerated. Id. Furthermore, the instance of medical problems increased with time served in 
prison. Id. The California Department of Corrections (CDC) found it housed 1000 inmates with 
a serious physical disability. Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252, 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
The facts about CDC inmates with disabilities presented in Armstrong were compiled from 
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their own unique challenges in prison, but the punishment of a 
disabled person should be no more severe than that of his fellow 
inmates. At the same time, prisons are restrained by safety and 
financial concerns and cannot sacrifice either at the whim of a 
particular inmate. The balance between these opposing needs is one 
that courts, including the United States Supreme Court, are asked to 
make. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Lane,3 
the court system was forced to examine the constitutionality of 
applying Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(“ADA”) to inmates with disabilities facing discrimination in state-
run prisons.4 Title II regulates public services by requiring that 
“reasonable modifications” be made for people with disabilities and 
allowing for private lawsuits seeking money damages to be brought 
 
surveys. Id. It was determined that of the 130,000 inmates incarcerated with the CDC, 345 used 
a wheelchair; 650 had lower extremity impairments that required the use of a walker, cane, or 
prosthesis; 141 could not hear even with the use of a hearing aid; and 219 had uncorrectable 
vision problems. Id. 
 See also Sandra J. Carnahan, The Americans with Disabilities Act in State Correctional 
Institutions, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 291, 292 (1999) (estimating rate of mental illness within the 
United States’ incarcerated population to be as high as 7.2%); T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic 
Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for 
Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 285 (1997) (stating that a conservative estimate 
of prevalence of serious mental disorders amongst prison and jail inmates is 6%); ALLEN J. 
BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NCJ 188215, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS, 2000, at 3 (2001) (estimating 
that as of 2000, one in every eight state prisoners was receiving some mental health therapy or 
counseling). 
 Although some inmates with disabilities are in medical wards, many are living amongst the 
general inmate population, whose ever-increasing size has been accompanied by deteriorating 
prison conditions. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2001 
432–35 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1. The Human Rights Watch’s report 
documented pervasive overcrowding in prisons, with twenty-two states and the federal prison 
system operating at 100% or more of their actual capacity. The report concluded that the system 
was simply unable to cope with the overflow, which resulted in rampant sexual and physical 
abuses. Id.  
 There is, however, one bright spot for inmates with disabilities: “[t]he fact that it is possible 
for prisoners to bring meaningful court actions against prison administrations at all remains at 
least a demonstration of democracy at work. As Dostoyevsky (1860) noted, ‘[T]he standards of 
a nation’s civilization can be judged by opening the doors of its prisons.’” Roy D. King, 
Prisons, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME & PUNISHMENT 589, 622 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). 
 3. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134, 12141–12150, 12161–12165; Lane, 541 U.S. at 513. 
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against states that are in noncompliance.5 Title II has also provided 
recourse for disabled state inmates.6  
In Lane, the Court’s holding was limited to the application of Title 
II to cases implicating “the fundamental right of access to the courts,” 
which it considered a valid exercise of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
section 5 enforcement power.7 Section 5 provides Congress with the 
authority to enforce the amendment through “appropriate 
legislation.”8 The Court held that a state’s Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suits for money damages brought by private citizens 
in federal court could be abrogated by section 5 in this instance.9 This 
holding was based on Congress’s constitutional authority to provide 
access to the courts under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause.10 The Court refused, however, to consider Title II’s 
application beyond access to the courts.11  
The Lane decision came on the heels of Board of Trustees v. 
Garrett,12 where the Court held that Congress had not validly 
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title I of 
the ADA with respect to private suits seeking money damages.13 
 
 5. See discussion of Title II infra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 6. In Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998), the 
Supreme Court held that state inmates are entitled to the protections of the ADA. Id. at 213. 
Yeskey is discussed further infra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
 Prior to the ADA’s enactment, eligible inmates brought actions as a constitutional violation 
or, if eligible, under the ADA’s predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which regulates 
federally funded entities. Elaine Gardner, The Legal Rights of Inmates with Physical 
Disabilities, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 175, 188–98 (1994). “The Eighth Amendment 
proscription against ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ is what inmates generally look to for 
protection against certain abuses which may exist in a correctional institution.” Id. at 199. 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “guarantees equal access for persons with disabilities to 
programs receiving federal financial assistance” and “has been utilized successfully by inmates 
with disabilities in federal courts and through administrative complaints.” Id. at 188, 190. 
 7. Lane, 541 U.S. at 534 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 9. Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34. 
 10. Id. at 532.  
 11. Id. at 531. (“Because we find that Title II unquestionably is valid [section] 5 
legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services, we 
need go no further.”). 
 12. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 13. Id. at 374. See also Lane, 541 U.S. at 514 (“In Garrett, we concluded that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking money damages for state violations of Title I of 
the ADA. We left open, however, the question whether the Eleventh Amendment permits suits 
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Lane did not create a complete bar against an application of Title II 
as Garrett did to Title I. Instead, through its limited holding, Lane 
left undetermined the circumstances in which Title II could be used 
to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Most recently, 
in United States v. Georgia (Goodman), the Court held that “insofar 
as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the 
States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.”14 This leaves the 
question of whether a state’s sovereign immunity can be abrogated 
for general violations of the law, which will likely become a more 
contentious issue.15 
This Note will examine the extent to which Title II of the ADA 
constitutionally abrogates state sovereign immunity for suits by 
inmates with disabilities facing discrimination. Part I of this Note 
examines the history and legislative intent of the ADA and how the 
ADA has been applied to inmates. Part II describes Supreme Court 
decisions on abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part III analyzes the 
application of Title II to inmates with disabilities and concludes that 
states’ sovereign immunity can be constitutionally abrogated under 
the ADA for violations of Title II that do not amount to 
unconstitutional conduct. 
I. THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA AND 
ITS APPLICATION TO STATE PRISONS 
The ADA was a reaction to what Congress considered to be 
widespread discrimination against people with disabilities.16 With its 
 
for money damages under Title II.”). 
 14. United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877, 882 (2006). 
 15. See id. at 883 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). The findings listed in the act that are relevant to this Note 
read as follows: 
 The Congress finds that— 
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and 
this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older; 
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, 
and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/26
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passage, Congress intended to bring about sweeping changes in the 
way that people with disabilities are treated in the United States and 
to ensure that the federal government plays a central role in bringing 
about those changes.17 Senator Tim Harkin, the act’s sponsor in the 
Senate, called it an “emancipation proclamation for all persons with 
disabilities.”18  
 
with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem; 
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as 
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, 
communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to 
public services; 
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination 
on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such 
discrimination; 
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, 
including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, 
transportation, and communication barriers, over-protective rules and policies, failure 
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification 
standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, 
activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities; . . . . 
Id. 
 17. Id. § 12101(b). 
It is the purpose of this [Act]— 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; [and] 
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the 
standards established in this [Act] on behalf of individuals with disabilities; . . . . 
Id. 
 18. 136 CONG. REC. 12, 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (“I just wanted to say 
that . . . today Congress opens the doors to all Americans with disabilities; that today we say no 
to fear, that we say no to ignorance, and that we say no to prejudice. The ADA is, indeed, the 
20th century Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with disabilities.”). 
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A. The ADA as an Emancipation Proclamation for People with 
Disabilities 
Congress’s first attempt to address the needs of people with 
disabilities was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.19 Section 504 of the 
act established a policy wherein public entities receiving federal 
funding must be operated without discrimination on the basis of 
disability.20 This provision was intended to radically alter the 
 
 19. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000). The Act was intended to authorize programs of various kinds 
to benefit people with disabilities. Id. § 701(b).  
The purposes of this chapter are— 
(1) to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic self-
sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into society, through—  
(A) statewide workforce investment systems implemented in accordance with title I of 
the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 that include, as integral components, 
comprehensive and coordinated state-of-the-art programs of vocational rehabilitation; 
(B) independent living centers and services; 
(C) research; 
(D) training; 
(E) demonstration projects; and 
(F) the guarantee of equal opportunity; and 
(2) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a leadership role in promoting the 
employment of individuals with disabilities, especially individuals with significant 
disabilities, and in assisting States and providers of services in fulfilling the aspirations 
of such individuals with disabilities for meaningful and gainful employment and 
independent living. 
Id. 
 20. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (referred to throughout this Note as “Section 504”).  
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States. . . . shall, 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by 
any Executive agency . . . .  
Id. 
 The language of Section 504 mirrors that of previous anti-discrimination enactments. See, 
e.g., Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (“No person 
in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance . . . .”); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/26
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treatment of people with disabilities, but its influence was 
significantly curtailed by its application solely to entities receiving 
federal funds.21  
The major difference between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act 
are their respective scopes.22 With the ADA, Congress extended 
 
 The courts have construed Section 504 to have created a broad government policy 
forbidding discrimination on the basis of disability by federally funded programs or activities. 
See, e.g., Lloyd v. Reg’l Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1281 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that 
Section 504 established affirmative rights and that a private cause of action could be invoked to 
vindicate those rights). In addition, the term “program or activity” has been interpreted to 
include entire units of a state or local government. These bodies are subject to Section 504 as 
long as there is a sufficient nexus between the federal assistance and the discriminatory 
practice. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified 
in scattered sections of 20, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), which amended Section 504 by defining 
“program or activity” to mean “all of the operations of a department . . . of a State or of a local 
government.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, the fact that a local governmental unit 
receives the funds only indirectly through the state does not preclude it from being considered a 
“program or activity” within the meaning of Section 504. See Bentley v. Cleveland County Bd. 
of County Comm’rs, 41 F.3d 600, 603 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that a county’s indirect receipt 
of federal funds from the Oklahoma Department of Transportation rendered it amenable to suit 
under the Rehabilitation Act). 
 21. The limitation that the entity be federally funded still allows some inmates to bring 
claims under the act, as it clearly applies to federal prisons and numerous state and local 
correctional facilities receiving federal funding. See Gardner, supra note 6, at 190.  
 There are several remedies available to eligible inmates under Section 504, including 
injunctive relief. In addition, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1986 to make it clear 
that litigants can pursue damages under Section 504. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). The 
amendment states that: 
[i]n a suit against a State for a violation of [this statute], . . . remedies (including 
remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same 
extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public 
or private entity other than a state. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(2). 
 22. The fact that the ADA was intended to be an extension of the Rehabilitation Act is 
evidenced by how closely Congress modeled the language of the ADA on the Rehabilitation 
Act. Note the similarities between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, quoted supra note 20 
and the ADA’s Section 202, cited infra note 23. 
 In addition to the similar wording of the two acts, Congress directed that the ADA be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (“Except 
as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser 
standard than the standards applied under [Section 504] of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . or 
the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.”). If an inmate’s claim is 
within the scope of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act claims, he will often bring suit 
under both acts. In these cases, courts will combine their analysis of the claims. Carnahan, 
supra note 2, at 296 n.50; see also Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
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coverage beyond federally funded programs to all public entities 
without regard to their source of funding.23 The ADA also defines 
disability broadly to encompass persons facing many different types 
of discrimination.24 In general, the ADA bars a public entity from 
denying people with disabilities services or failing to provide services 
like those offered to others. Each of the ADA’s five titles targets a 
specific area in which people with disabilities encounter 
discrimination.25 Title II of the ADA is the title under which an 
 
(“The requirements for stating a claim under the ADA are virtually identical to those under 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 The term “qualified individual with a disability” means 
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, 
policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation 
barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities 
provided by a public entity. 
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 
 A “public entity” is defined as “any State or local government” or “any department, 
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government.” Id. § 12131(1)(A)–(B). 
 In its regulations, the Department of Justice has interpreted the ADA to apply to all 
services, programs, and activities “provided or made available by public entities.” 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.102(a) (1991). The analysis accompanying this regulation makes it clear that the ADA 
applies to virtually “anything that a public entity does.” Id. §§ 35.694, 35.696.  
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The ADA’s definition of “disability” is quoted supra note 1. 
Gardner further discusses the ADA’s definition of “disability”: 
The ADA protects individuals with disabilities. It covers not only those with 
traditionally recognized disabilities, but also those who have any impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity. Included in the definition, additionally, are 
those who have recovered from a disability, such as individuals who have recovered 
from cancer. Finally, the ADA covers individuals who have no disability but who are 
treated as having one, such as individuals with facial deformities, or persons who are 
HIV-positive but have not developed AIDS symptoms. 
Gardner, supra note 6, at 178–79. 
 25. The five titles of the ADA are Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2000), which 
addresses employment; Title II, id. §§ 12131–12134, 12141–12150, 12161–12165, which 
addresses public services; Title III, id. §§ 12181–12189, which addresses public 
accommodations and services operated by private entities; Title IV, 47 U.S.C. §§ 153221, 
153225, 153661, which addresses telecommunications; and Title V, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–
12213, which contains miscellaneous provisions.  
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inmate could bring a suit and address discrimination against a 
“qualified individual with a disability” by a “public entity.”26 
B. The Application of the ADA to State Prisons 
Within the ADA’s findings Congress noted that there are many 
disabled Americans who are discriminated against in areas including 
“institutionalization.”27 Despite this language, the courts questioned 
whether the term “public entity” included state prisons.28 The issue 
was whether an inmate was a “qualified individual with a disability” 
within the meaning of Title II, because an inmate’s participation in 
the services, programs, or activities of the prison was not voluntary.29  
The Supreme Court resolved this issue in Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,30 which held that Title II 
prohibits state prisons, as “public entities,” from discriminating 
 
 26. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). The legislative history of the ADA evidences some concern 
for inmates with disabilities as well. See, e.g., 2 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 
101st CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 101-336, THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT (1990) (jailers took away wheelchairs as a form of punishment); U.S. 
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 
(1983), cited by H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28 (1990) (prisons have inadequate treatment 
and rehabilitation programs for inmates with disabilities). 
 28. The federal appellate courts split over whether state prisons were within the purview 
of Title II. See, e.g., Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995). 
We imagine that most prison officials would be surprised to learn that they were 
subject to these laws: [p]rison administrators are responsible for maintaining internal 
order and discipline, for securing their institutions against unauthorized access or 
escape, and for rehabilitating, to the extent that human nature and inadequate resources 
allow, the inmates placed in their custody, . . . they generally do not provide services, 
programs, or activities as those terms are ordinarily understood. A prohibition on 
discrimination in those three realms thus would not seem to reach prisons. 
Id. at 1347 (citation and quotations omitted). But see Crawford v. Ind. Dept. of Corr., 115 F.3d 
481 (7th Cir. 1997). 
Invidious discrimination by governmental agencies, such as Indiana’s prison system, 
violates the equal protection clause even if the discrimination is not racial, though 
racial discrimination was the original focus of the clause. In creating a remedy against 
such discrimination, Congress was acting well within its powers under section 5 [even 
though the ADA forbids] . . . a form of discrimination remote from the contemplation 
of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 487. 
 29. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998). 
 30. Id. 
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against inmates, who are “qualified individuals with a disability.”31 
The Court declined, however, to consider the question of whether the 
application of the ADA to state prisons was constitutional.32 
II. THE REACH OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S SECTION 5 
POWER 
The question that Yeskey declined to consider was resolved in part 
by Goodman, which held that Title II’s application to state prisons is 
constitutional with respect to conduct that violates the Fourteenth 
 
 31. Id. at 208–09. An inmate with hypertension was denied admission to a motivational 
boot camp on the basis of his disability. Id. The Supreme Court stated that the ADA’s 
“language unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage.” Id. at 209. 
 The petitioners argued that the words “eligibility” and “participation” in the ADA’s text 
implied that the actions of the applicant seeking the benefits from the state be voluntary. Id. at 
211. The Court disagreed and found that such an interpretation was “wrong on two counts.” Id. 
First, “the words do not connote voluntariness.” Id. Second, “even if the words did connote 
voluntariness, it would still not be true that all prison services, programs, and activities are 
excluded from the ADA because participation in them is not voluntary.” Id. (quotations 
omitted). The Court cited as an example the prison law library, which “is a service (and the use 
of it an activity), which inmates are free to take or leave.” Id. 
 The Court also considered the importance of the Congress’s finding that people with 
disabilities are subject to discrimination in “institutionalization.” See supra note 16 and 
accompanying text. The Court found that the word “institutionalization” “can be thought to 
include penal institutions.” Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211–12. Even if Congress had not anticipated 
that the ADA would be applied to state prisons, it is not impossible to do so. Id. at 212. The 
Court stated that “the fact that a statute can be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by 
Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.” Id. at 212 (citation 
omitted). 
 “In order to demonstrate an ADA claim pursuant to Title II, an inmate must demonstrate: 
(1) a qualified disability; (2) denial of participation in or the benefits of services, programs, or 
activities provided by the prison; and (3) a disability-based reason for the denial of services, 
programs, or activities.” Laubach v. Roberts, 90 P.3d 961, 968–69 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). An 
inmate can either make a claim for injunctive relief or for a damage award. Successful litigants 
can also be compensated for their attorneys’ fees. These remedies are similar to those available 
under the Rehabilitation Act, discussed supra note 21. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (“The 
remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [the Rehabilitation Act] . . . shall be the remedies, 
procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the 
basis of disability in violation of section 12132.”). 
 32. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212. In recognizing that it had avoided this question, the Supreme 
Court stated that “[w]e do not address another issue presented by petitioners: whether 
application of the ADA to state prisons is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under 
either the Commerce Clause . . . or [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. The Court 
did not find it necessary to consider this issue, because it had not been before either the district 
court or the court of appeals. Id. 
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Amendment.33 However, not all of the conduct prohibited by Title II 
in state prisons is unconstitutional conduct.34 A determination of the 
extent of Title II’s constitutionality as applied to inmates with 
disabilities can be made by applying the test the Supreme Court used 
to evaluate the ADA in both Garrett and Lane.  
The Court has held that Congress can deny a state its Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity in the limited circumstance in 
which it has both “unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate” in 
the statute at issue, and it has “acted pursuant to a valid grant of 
constitutional authority.”35 In the case of the ADA, Congress stated 
clearly that the states will not be immune under the Eleventh 
Amendment for violations of the ADA.36 Therefore, the question 
 
 33. United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877, 882 (2006). 
 34. Brief for the Petitioner at 44, United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877 
(2006) (Nos. 04-1203, 04-1236), 2005 WL 1812489 at *38. 
 35. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).  
 The Eleventh Amendment proscribes that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. But see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (“[T]he 
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies . . . are 
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of [section] 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 The bar on bringing private suits for money damages against the states has not been 
extended to state officials. The doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allows for 
suits against state officials in which prospective equitable relief is sought to end continuing 
violations of federal law. Young was recently reaffirmed by the Court in Garrett: 
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States’ sovereign 
immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not 
mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. 
Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards 
can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by 
private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young. In addition, 
state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other 
aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress. 
Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001) (citation omitted).  
 It has been argued that the Supreme Court has misinterpreted the Eleventh Amendment. 
See Robert A. Levy, Tennessee v. Lane: How Illegitimate Power Negated Non-Existent 
Immunity, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 161 (2004) (arguing that Tennessee was not entitled to 
immunity in Lane because the Eleventh Amendment does not confer immunity at all in federal 
question cases), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2004/illegitimatepower.pdf.  
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (stating that the states are not be immune, because Congress 
“invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth 
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before the Court in Garrett, Lane, and Goodman was whether 
Congress’s intended abrogation of the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity was a valid exercise of the power granted by section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.37  
A. The Supreme Court’s Test for Determining the Extent of 
Congress’s Section 5 Power as Stated in City of Boerne v. Flores 
The Supreme Court has granted Congress latitude in the reach of 
its Fourteenth Amendment legislation. The Court has held that when 
acting under the authority of section 5, Congress can prohibit conduct 
not directly forbidden by the amendment in order to remedy or deter 
direct violations.38 The Court, however, has drawn a distinction 
 
amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination 
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities”). 
 37. The discussion in Part II is limited to Congress’s constitutional authority to abrogate a 
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, because, in Garrett, 
the Court stated definitively that Congress may not do so under the commerce clause, which 
was one basis of authority advanced by Congress in the ADA. See supra note 36. The Supreme 
Court has stated that “Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I,” which include the commerce 
clause. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 79 (stating that if the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act “rests solely on Congress’[s] Article I commerce power, the 
private petitioners in today’s cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers”); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (“The Eleventh Amendment 
restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the 
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”). 
 38. The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees is defined in the amendment’s 
first section: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 In Lane, the Court returned to a definition of the scope of Congress’s section 5 authority 
that it had first laid out in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1879). Lane, 541 U.S. at 
520 n.3. 
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions 
they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil 
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not 
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power. 
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between measures that are remedial or preventive and those that 
create a “substantive change in the governing law.”39 Those measures 
that do create a substantive change are considered unconstitutional.40 
The Court has acknowledged that this distinction is a difficult one to 
maintain, but it is one that must be made nonetheless.41  
The Court has developed a test to aid in determining whether 
section 5 legislation is constitutional. This three-part test was first 
stated in City of Boerne v. Flores42 and examines the “congruence 
and proportionality” of the legislation to the injury to be prevented or 
remedied.43 First, the scope of the constitutional right at issue must be 
identified.44 Second, a history and pattern of unconstitutional conduct 
by the states must have been identified by Congress.45 Finally, 
analysis of the statute is undertaken to decide if it is a congruent and 
proportional response to that history and pattern of unconstitutional 
treatment.46  
B. The Supreme Court’s Application of the Boerne Test in Garrett to 
Hold Title I Unconstitutional 
The majority opinion in Garrett was limited to the issue of 
whether the respondents could recover money damages in a suit 
 
Id.; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (“Legislation which deters or 
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power 
even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 
‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’” (quoting Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). 
 39. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518–19. The Supreme Court noted that Congress’s authority “is 
not unlimited” and distinguished constitutional legislation from that which makes “a 
substantive change in the governing law.” Id.  
 40. Id. at 520. 
 41. Id. The Court noted that Congress has “wide latitude in determining where” the 
distinction lies, but that there is a distinction and it “must be observed.” Id. 
 42. Lane, 541 U.S. at 520–21. 
 43. Id. (“There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”). In Garrett, the Court stated that “it 
is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional 
guarantees. 531 U.S. at 365 (citation omitted). “Accordingly, [section] 5 legislation reaching 
beyond the scope of [section] 1’s actual guarantees must exhibit ‘congruence and 
proportionality’ . . . .” Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 368. 
 46. Id. at 374. 
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against the state for employment discrimination on the basis of a 
disability under Title I.47 The Court applied the Boerne test to find 
that Congress had not validly abrogated the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity to suits for money damages under Title I.48 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court initially attempted to define the 
“metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question,” which is 
the first step in the Boerne test.49 The Court found that the right at 
issue was the limitation that the equal protection clause50 “places 
upon [s]tates’ treatment of [people with disabilities].”51  
The Court then looked at the precedent it had established with 
regard to the equal protection clause in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center.52 In Cleburne, the Court held that a state is not 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special 
accommodations for people with disabilities in the employment 
 
 47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2000). Title I’s general bar against discrimination on the 
basis of disability states that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id. 
§ 12112(a). 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court in Garrett and was joined 
by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. 531 U.S. at 358. Justice Kennedy also 
filed a concurring opinion in which Justice O’Connor joined. Id. at 374. With the exception of 
Justice O’Connor, these same justices composed the dissenters in Lane. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 
U.S. 509, 538 (2004). The Court limited its decision in Garrett to the issue of sovereign 
immunity. 531 U.S. at 364 (“The question . . . is whether Congress acted within its 
constitutional authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money damages 
under the ADA.”). In a footnote, the Court stated that it had purposely avoided determining the 
constitutionality of Title II at that time. Id. at 360 n.1 (“We are not disposed to decide the 
constitutional issue whether Title II, which has somewhat different remedial provisions from 
Title I, is appropriate legislation under [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when the 
parties have not favored us with briefing on the statutory question.”). 
 The two respondents in Garrett were Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash, both employees of 
the state of Alabama. Id. at 362. Garrett alleged that when she returned to work after being 
diagnosed with breast cancer and undergoing treatment, she was forced to take a position with 
lower pay and less authority. Id. Ash, who suffered from both asthma and sleep apnea, asked 
his employer to make accommodations for his conditions. Id. The employer, however, made 
none of the accommodations he requested and gave him lower performance evaluations after he 
filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. 
 48. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. 
 49. Id. at 368. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 51. Id. at 365. 
 52. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/26
p563 Evans book pages.doc  12/18/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  The ADA and Inmates with Disabilities 577 
 
 
context when there is a rational basis for the state’s actions.53 
Proceeding under the rational basis standard of review, the Court 
found that a state need not make allowances for people with 
disabilities.54 Instead, any special accommodations must come 
through changes in state law and not through the equal protection 
clause.55 
In the second step of the Boerne test, the Garrett court determined 
that the ADA’s legislative record failed to show that Congress had 
identified “a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment 
against [people with disabilities].”56 The respondents cited several 
examples from the congressional record that evidenced state 
discrimination on the basis of disability.57 The Court, however, found 
 
 53. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (“[T]he result of Cleburne is that States are not required by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for [people with disabilities], so 
long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.”); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 
U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (“Garrett . . . concerned legislation that targeted classifications subject to 
rational-basis review.”). This is different from sex-based classifications, which are subject to “a 
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny.” Id. 
 In Cleburne, the Supreme Court held that there are two standards of review for state 
legislation or official actions that are challenged for having denied equal protection. 473 U.S. at 
439. 
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. . . . 
[This rule] gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national 
origin. . . . [These types of laws are] subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained 
only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
Id. at 440. 
 This second rule has also been applied to legislative classifications based on gender. See 
Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).  
 54. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450. 
 55. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (stating that a state can “hold to job-qualification 
requirements which do not make allowance for [people with disabilities]. If special 
accommodations for [people with disabilities] are to be required, they have to come from 
positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 369. The respondents cited, in their brief, six examples from the congressional 
record of employment discrimination against people with disabilities that involved the states: 
A department head at the University of North Carolina refused to hire an applicant for 
the position of health administrator because he was blind; similarly, a student at a state 
university in South Dakota was denied an opportunity to practice teach because the 
dean at that time was convinced that blind people could not teach in public schools. A 
microfilmer at the Kansas Department of Transportation was fired because he had 
epilepsy; deaf workers at the University of Oklahoma were paid a lower salary than 
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it “telling” that only these few examples existed, given the large 
number of people employed by the states.58 One of the primary 
observations offered in the concurring opinion filed in this case was 
also the absence of an identified pattern of disparate treatment.59  
The Court then proceeded to the third step of the Boerne test and 
addressed the congruence and proportionality of the legislation to the 
state violations.60 The Court found that the ADA’s accommodation 
duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required.61 This is because 
the ADA makes unlawful a range of alternative responses that would 
also be reasonable and would not impose an undue burden on an 
employer.62 
 
those who could hear. The Indiana State Personnel Office informed a woman with a 
concealed disability that she should not disclose it if she wished to obtain employment. 
Id. 
 58. Id. at 370. In response to the respondents’ observations, the Court stated that “[i]n 
1990, the States alone employed more than 4.5 million people. It is telling, we think, that given 
these large numbers, Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state 
discrimination in employment against [people with disabilities].” Id. 
 The respondents also contended that the inquiry into unconstitutional discrimination should 
extend beyond the states to units of local government. Id. at 368. The Court acknowledged that 
these were state actors, but denied that the inquiry should be extended to them. Id. at 368–69. It 
stated that the Eleventh Amendment only affords the states some protection from private claims 
for damages. Id. at 369. Therefore, it would make no sense to consider the constitutional 
violations of local units of government and the states together. Id. 
 59. Id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he 
makes clear his belief that the ADA is important legislation in confronting the prejudice that 
people with disabilities endure. Id. at 375. However, he states that “[t]he predicate for money 
damages against an unconsenting State in suits brought by private persons must be a federal 
statute enacted upon the documentation of patterns of constitutional violations committed by 
the State in its official capacity.” Id. at 376.  
 60. Id. at 371–72. 
 61. Reasonable accommodation in Title I is defined as:  
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities; and  
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant 
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment 
or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals 
with disabilities. 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). 
 62. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.  
The ADA does except employers from the reasonable accommodation requirement 
where the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
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C. The Supreme Court’s Application of the Boerne Test in Lane to 
Hold That Title II is Constitutional Insofar as It Grants Access to the 
Courts 
As it did in Garrett, the Court in Lane defined the question before 
it as whether Congress has exceeded its section 5 power.63 Unlike 
Garrett, the portion of the ADA at issue was Title II.64 The Court 
applied the Boerne test to uphold the constitutionality of Title II with 
respect to access to the courts.65  
Under the first step of the Boerne test, the Court found that, like 
Garrett, the constitutional right at issue was the “prohibition on 
irrational disability discrimination.”66 Unlike Title I, however, the 
Court noted that Title II also seeks to enforce other constitutional 
 
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity. However, even with 
this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required 
in that it makes unlawful a range of alternative responses that would be reasonable but 
would fall short of imposing an undue burden upon the employer. 
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
 The Supreme Court reached this conclusion by comparing Title I to the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, which was based on “abundant evidence of States’ systematic denial of [Fifteenth 
Amendment] rights.” Id. at 373. Congress’s response in this instance was “detailed but limited.” 
Id. 
 The dissenting opinion in Garrett critiques each of the majority’s conclusions, but indicates 
that the dissenting justices would be willing to uphold Title I under a more simple examination 
of section 5 power. Id. at 377. The dissent argues that section 5 grants Congress the power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, and the Equal Protection 
Clause is violated by the states when there is not a rational basis between the “disparity of 
treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. The dissenting justices noted that 
they would defer to Congress’s judgment that Title I was necessary to rectify such a disparity in 
the area of state discrimination in the employment of people with disabilities. Id. 
 63. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004). (“The question presented in this case is 
whether Title II exceeds Congress’ power under [section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 Lane arose out of an action filed against the state of Tennessee by George Lane and 
Beverly Jones, both of whom were paraplegics. Id. Lane alleged that he was forced to crawl up 
the stairs of a county courthouse that did not have an elevator in order to answer criminal 
charges. Id. at 513–14. Jones, a certified court reporter, alleged that she was not able to access 
many court rooms, and was therefore unable to work and to participate in the judicial process. 
Id. at 514. 
 64. Id. at 513. 
 65. Id. at 520. “Section 5 legislation is valid if it exhibits ‘a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end.’” Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
 66. Id. at 522. 
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guarantees such as rights relating to access to the courts.67 These 
rights are protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, and 
the First Amendment’s right to access criminal proceedings.68  
Although section 5 authorizes Congress to enact “reasonably 
prophylactic remedial legislation,” the Court found that the harm 
caused by inaccessible courts may warrant stronger measures.69 
Therefore, the Court determined that the right to access courts called 
for “a standard of judicial review at least as searching, and in some 
cases more searching, than the standard that applies to sex-based 
classifications,”70 which the Court had reviewed in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.71 The Court then 
proceeded under a heightened standard of review of the state’s 
conduct.72 
The Court moved on to the second step of the Boerne test in 
search of a history and pattern of violations of the constitutional right 
to access the courts. The Court began by stating that Title II was 
enacted “against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the 
administration of state services and programs, including systematic 
 
 67. Id. at 522–23. 
 68. Id. at 523. 
[T]he right of access to the courts at issue in this case, [is] protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [In addition, t]he Due Process Clause 
and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the States via the 
Fourteenth Amendment, both guarantee to a criminal defendant . . . the right to be 
present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the 
proceedings. The Due Process Clause also requires the States to afford certain civil 
litigants a meaningful opportunity to be heard by removing obstacles to their full 
participation in judicial proceedings. We have held that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees to criminal defendants the right to trial by a jury composed of a fair cross 
section of the community, noting that the exclusion of identifiable segments playing 
major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury 
trial. And, finally, we have recognized that members of the public have a right of 
access to criminal proceedings secured by the First Amendment.  
Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
 69. Id. at 523–24. 
 70. Id. at 529. 
 71. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). Hibbs concerned the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 
The Supreme Court “approved the family-care leave provision of the FMLA as valid [section] 5 
legislation” because it “was targeted at sex-based classifications, which are subject to a 
heightened standard of judicial review.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 528–29. 
 72. Lane, 541 U.S. at 529. 
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deprivations of fundamental rights.”73 It noted abuses in a number of 
areas, including the “penal system.”74 After concluding its 
examination of the evidence, the Court found that Congress had 
reached a similar conclusion in its own investigation of 
discrimination on the basis of disability.75 Upon the basis of these 
findings, the Court determined that there was extensive 
“unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in 
the provision of public services.”76 
The final question for the Court in applying the Boerne test was 
whether Title II was an appropriate response to this history and 
pattern of discrimination.77 Noting the wide scope of Title II, the 
Court chose to limit its inquiry to whether “Congress had the power 
under [section] 5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to the 
courts.”78 The Court considered Title II’s requirement that 
“reasonable modifications” be made to a public service an 
appropriate response to the history and pattern of discrimination in 
the area of access to the courts.79 This was especially true, the Court 
believed, given the failure of previous legislation to correct this 
 
 73. Id. at 524. 
 74. Id. at 525. After noting that the Court itself had found deprivations of rights in areas of 
voting, marrying, serving as jurors, unjustified commitment, abuse and neglect in mental health 
hospitals, and zoning decisions, the Court stated that “other courts [have] document[ed] a 
pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, programs 
and activities, including the penal system, public education, and voting.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 527–28. Congress’s findings are set forth in the ADA and are cited supra note 
16. 
 76. Id. at 528. 
 77. Id. at 530. 
 78. Id. at 531. The Supreme Court acknowledged that unlike other statutes that it has 
reviewed for validity under section 5, Title II “reaches a wide array of official conduct in an 
effort to enforce an equally wide array of constitutional guarantees.” Id. at 530. Therefore, the 
Court chose not to decide “whether Congress can validly subject the States to private suits for 
money damages for failing to provide reasonable access [to such public services as] hockey 
rinks, or even to voting booths,” but simply failure to provide access to the courts. Id. at 530–
31. 
 79. Id. at 531–32. The “reasonable modifications” requirement is found in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12131(2), which is quoted supra note 23. 
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deficiency.80 Moreover, Title II was a proper remedy given the states’ 
due process responsibility.81 
 
 80. Id. at 531 (“The unequal treatment of [people with disabilities] in the administration of 
judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to 
remedy the problem of disability discrimination.”). 
 81. Id. at 532. “This duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established 
due process principle that, ‘within the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all 
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard’ in its courts.” Id. (quoting Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). 
 Two dissents were filed in Lane: one by Chief Justice Rehnquist and another by Justice 
Scalia. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent took issue with the majority’s as-applied approach to 
Title II. He argued instead that Title II should be a valid exercise of section 5 power as a whole 
or not at all. Id. at 538. He first stated that discrimination based on disability is subject to a 
rational basis standard of review. Id. at 540 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause permits a State to 
classify on the basis of disability so long as it has a rational basis for doing so.”). It is unclear 
under which step of the Boerne test the level of scrutiny is determined; Chief Justice made the 
determination at the onset, whereas the majority did so as part of step one. Consequently, unlike 
the majority, Rehnquist did not apply a heightened level of scrutiny to the state law. Id. at 539–
40. Rehnquist then proceeded through the Boerne test in a fashion similar to the majority 
opinion in Garrett, which he also wrote. He found that the relevant constitutional protection is 
not only the Fourteenth Amendment’s bar against irrational discrimination, but certain other 
rights safeguarded by Title II, such as the due process right to access to the courts. Id. at 540–
41. He then analyzed the history and pattern of violations of disabled individuals’ due process 
rights and found the record to be barren. Id. at 541. Finally, Rehnquist stated that the remedy is 
not congruent and proportional to the defect, because Title II allows people with disabilities to 
sue in “virtually every interaction they have with the State.” Id. at 549. 
 Justice Scalia also wrote a dissenting opinion to emphasize that the congruence and 
proportionality standard is too “malleable.” Id. at 556. He stated that “such malleable standards 
as ‘proportionality’ [can be] vehicles for the implementation of individual judges’ policy 
preferences.” Id. Rather than use a proportionality standard, Scalia would limit the authority of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to legislation enforcing its provisions and dispense with almost all 
legislation enacted for the purpose of reinforcement. Id. at 558. However, Justice Scalia appears 
unable to square his test with the Court’s upholding of acts related to racial discrimination. He 
stated that: 
[A]ll of our later cases except Hibbs that give an expansive meaning to “enforce” in 
[section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and all of our earlier cases that even suggest 
such an expansive meaning in dicta, involved congressional measures that were 
directed exclusively against, or were used in the particular case to remedy, racial 
discrimination. 
Id. at 561. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/26
p563 Evans book pages.doc  12/18/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  The ADA and Inmates with Disabilities 583 
 
 
D. Goodman Resolved in Part the Question of How Title II Applies to 
Inmates with Disabilities 
In Lane’s wake, courts were confronted with the question of the 
extent to which Title II could be constitutionally applied.82 There 
were three possible interpretations of Lane in the context of state 
prisons. First, the ADA validly abrogates the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity with respect to Title II.83 Second, Title II 
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity only insofar as it prohibits 
unconstitutional conduct.84 Third, Title II does not apply at all in the 
prison context.85 
The Supreme Court resolved this question in part in Goodman. It 
adopted the second of the three approaches—that Title II validly 
abrogates state sovereign immunity insofar as the conduct “actually 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”86 The extent to which the ADA 
 
 82. Compare Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791, 792 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the state is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II) with 
Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that Title II did not validly 
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity as applied in Eighth Amendment context to state prisons) 
and Cochran v. Pinchak, 401 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding Title II inapplicable 
because the asserted constitutional right was not a fundamental right like access to the courts). 
 83. See, e.g., Phiffer, 384 F.3d at 792 (holding that the state is not entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under Title II). 
 84. This was ultimately the holding of the Supreme Court in United States v. Georgia 
(Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006). 
 85. See, e.g., Cochran, 401 F.3d at 193 (holding Title II inapplicable because the asserted 
constitutional right was not a fundamental right like access to the courts). 
 86. Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 881. 
While the Members of this Court have disagreed regarding the scope of Congress’s 
prophylactic enforcement powers under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, no 
one doubts that [Section] 5 grants Congress the power to enforce the provisions of the 
Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of 
these provision. 
Id. (quotations and ellipsis omitted). 
 The petitioner, Tony Goodman, was a paraplegic inmate in the Georgia state prison system. 
Id. at 879. He alleged numerous deficiencies in the accommodation of his disability. Id. The 
District Court, acting after Garrett, dismissed his Title II claims on the basis that they were 
barred by state sovereign immunity. Id. at 880. Goodman appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, 
which heard argument in Miller v. King (discussed supra note 82) on the same day. Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 34, at 6–7. On the basis of its decision in Miller, the Court held that 
Goodman’s claims for money damages against the state were barred by sovereign immunity. 
Goodman, 126 S. Ct. at 880. 
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validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment for Title II claims not 
based on such conduct is the question that remains.87  
III. TITLE II IS A CONGRUENT AND PROPORTIONAL RESPONSE TO 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST STATE INMATES WITH DISABILITIES THAT 
BOTH THREATENS AND ACTUALLY VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION 
An analysis of Title II’s application to state inmates with 
disabilities using the three-part Boerne test shows that the statute is a 
constitutional form of section 5 legislation.88 This analysis will reveal 
that Title II as applied to state discrimination against inmates with 
disabilities is a congruent and proportional response to both actual 
and threatened constitutional violations. The Supreme Court held in 
Lane that Title II is unquestionably valid “as it applies to the class of 
cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services.”89 Similarly, 
prisons must be accessible for people with disabilities.  
 
 87. Id. at 884 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I agree with the Court’s decision to await further 
proceedings before trying to define the extent to which Title II validly abrogates state sovereign 
immunity in the prison context.”). 
 88. The Supreme Court’s new composition makes it difficult to predict how it will resolve 
section 5 questions in the future. Justice O’Connor’s perspective was critical in both Lane and 
Garrett. According to Representative Tony Coelho, the former House majority whip and a 
leading drafter of the ADA, the majority focused on the issue of court access in Lane “in order 
to get Justice O’Connor’s vote.” Charles Lane, Disabled Win Right to Sue States Over Court 
Access, WASH. POST, May 18, 2004, at A2. By narrowing the issue, the majority managed to 
uphold a disputed application of the law, without pre-judging future cases. Linda Greenhouse, 
Justices Find States Can Be Liable for Not Making Courthouses Accessible to Disabled, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A20. “[I]t was clearly more important for Justice Stevens[, who wrote 
the majority opinion,] and his usual three allies to win Justice O’Connor’s support than to set 
out a far-reaching critique of [Garrett] or of others she had joined on the states’-rights side.” Id. 
The fact that the Court was awaiting Justice Alito’s confirmation when Goodman was decided 
may be the reason for its limited holding. See Gina Holland, Supreme Court Allows Disabled 
Inmate's Lawsuit in States’ Rights Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2006, at A12. 
A dozen states had urged the court to bar general suits by inmates under the disabilities 
law. Their attorney, Gene Schaerr of Washington, said that justices probably 
“recognized Sandra Day O'Connor has announced her resignation and they'd rather 
wait until they have a full court in place until they address that issue head on.” Schaerr 
added: “I think that’s very good news for the states.” 
Id. 
 89. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004). 
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A. Title II Enforces Basic Constitutional Rights that Are not 
Foregone as a Result of Incarceration 
In the first step of the Boerne test the scope of the constitutional 
right at issue must be identified. For the inmate with a disability, 
these rights include protection from irrational disability 
discrimination.90 The importance that the Supreme Court attaches to 
this right will determine the level of scrutiny that it will use in 
analyzing a state’s actions.91  
People with disabilities are not a suspect class requiring a 
heightened standard of review.92 At the same time, discrimination 
against people with disabilities in state prisons warrants more than 
the rational basis scrutiny that the Court applied in the employment 
context in Garrett.93 This is because, like Lane, certain constitutional 
guarantees are infringed upon in the prison so a “more searching 
judicial review” is required.94 Given that a constitutional right is at 
issue in the case of an inmate with a disability, the Court should 
apply a heightened level of scrutiny to a state law infringing on that 
right, or the Court should defer to Congress’s identification of a 
pattern of state violations of that constitutional right.95  
The Supreme Court has declared that state control over the 
individual “is at its apex” in the prison context.96 However, this does 
not mean that the state operates without restraint in this arena.97 One 
 
 90. Id. at 522 (“Title II . . . seeks to enforce [the Fourteenth Amendment’s] prohibition on 
irrational disability discrimination.”). 
 91. In Goodman, the Court did not state what type of scrutiny it would apply, which is 
why this question remains unanswered. United States v. Georgia (Goodman), 126 S. Ct. 877, 
878–82 (2006). 
 92. Lane, 541 U.S. at 529 (“[S]ex-based classifications . . . are subject to a heightened 
standard of judicial scrutiny.”). 
 93. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). 
 94. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23 (Title II “seeks to enforce a variety of . . . basic 
constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial 
review.”). 
 95. Id. at 529 (citing Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735–37 (2003)). 
The FMLA, the legislation at issue in Hibbs, “was targeted at sex-based classifications, which 
are subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny. [This makes it] ‘easier for Congress to 
show a pattern of state constitutional violations’ than in Garrett . . . which concerned legislation 
that targeted [a classification] subject to rational-basis review.” Id. 
 96. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005). 
 97. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 
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of the states’ principle obligations is the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,98 which applies to 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.99 A state’s failure to 
accommodate the needs of inmates with disabilities can violate this 
constitutional requirement.100 In addition, the other guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights, which are also applicable to the states by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, apply in the prison context.101 Finally, 
inmates with disabilities are protected by the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,102 and its due process clause protects 
liberty and property interests.103  
B. There is a History and Pattern of Discrimination in the 
Administration of State Prisons 
After identifying the constitutional right at issue the next step is to 
determine if there is a history and pattern of unconstitutional 
discrimination. In Garrett, the Supreme Court noted that there were 
 
(1989) (“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, 
the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his 
safety and general well-being.”). 
 98. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 99. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). 
 100. There are two facets of the cruel and unusual punishments clause contained in the 
Eighth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. First, it prevents excessive force. See Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (stating that the clause proscribes “physically barbarous 
punishments”). Second, and more relevant to the present inquiry, it also prohibits “deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 104. There is both an objective and subjective 
standard for what constitutes deliberate indifference. Objectively, “the deprivation alleged must 
be . . . sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quotations omitted). 
Subjective indifference requires that a prison official have a “sufficiently culpable state of 
mind,” which is “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. (quotations omitted). 
 101. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (“Prison walls do not form a barrier 
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”); see also Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (“There is no iron curtain drawn between the 
Constitution and the prisons of this country.”). However, the protections of the Constitution do 
not apply exactly as they would to a civilian. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) 
(stating that the “urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions [means 
that] due deference [must be given] to prison administrators' experience and expertise”). 
 102. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2395 (2005) (expressing the opinion 
that an inmate with a disability could be subject to “atypical and significant hardship within the 
correctional context”). 
 103. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556. (“Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due 
Process Clause. They may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”). 
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relatively few congressional findings of state discrimination against 
the disabled in the employment context; the Court considered this 
evidence that there was not widespread state discrimination in this 
arena because of the large number of people employed by the states 
and the even greater number of Americans with disabilities.104 In 
Lane, the Court examined the unequal treatment of people with 
disabilities in the administration of all types of state services, 
programs, and activities, including the administration of the “penal 
system,” in deciding that there was a history and pattern of 
discrimination with respect to access to the courts.105 The Lane 
Court’s willingness to look beyond findings related strictly to access 
to the courts stems from the application of a higher standard of 
review than rational basis review. In Garrett, where the Court would 
proceed under a rational basis standard of review, the examination of 
the history and pattern of discrimination was far more scrutinizing. 
Under the heightened standard of review in this case, the Court 
proceeded as it did in Lane, by examining the entire record of 
discrimination in public services, programs, and activities to find that 
Title II is an appropriate remedy.106 
Regardless of the lens through which the Court examines the 
evidence of unconstitutional treatment of inmates with disabilities, 
the existence of such discrimination should be readily apparent. Both 
Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized a “history of unfair 
and often grotesque mistreatment” of people with disabilities.107 
Specific to the prison context, Congress identified 
“institutionalization” as one of the areas in which “discrimination . . . 
persists.”108 The Court has recognized that in the ADA Congress 
targeted “penal institutions”109 to ensure that inmates with disabilities 
 
 104. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001). 
 105. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 525 (2004). 
 106. Id. at 529. 
 107. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985) (citation omitted). 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2000). 
 109. Pa. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211–12 (1998). In Lane the Supreme 
Court noted several examples of discrimination in the penal system in a footnote, which further 
evidenced an acknowledgement of discrimination in this area. Lane, 541 U.S. at 525 n.11. The 
Court stated that “[t]he decisions of other courts . . . document a pattern of unequal treatment in 
the administration of a wide range of public services, programs, and activities, including the 
penal system . . . .” Id. at 525. The Court then cited three cases as examples: LaFaut v. Smith, 
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are not denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”110 Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the 
history and pattern of discrimination against people with disabilities 
that Congress and the Court recognized in the administration of 
public services and access to public facilities is impeded by prison 
walls.111 
C. Title II is a Congruent and Proportional Response to the History 
and Pattern of Discrimination in State Prisons 
The third step in the Boerne analysis is to determine the 
congruence and proportionality of Title II to a state’s discrimination 
against inmates with disabilities. Unlike Title I, which the Garrett 
court thought placed an undue burden on employers, Title II’s 
requirement that reasonable modifications be made for people with 
disabilities was seen as an appropriate response to the discrimination 
at issue in Lane.112 The Supreme Court’s decision in Garrett was 
influenced by the rational basis standard of review it had adopted for 
analyzing Title I. Under the heightened standard of review applied in 
Lane, however, the Court viewed Title II as an appropriate response 
to the history and pattern of discrimination, especially given the 
failure of previous efforts to provide access to the courts for people 
with disabilities.113 As they did in Lane, the Court should find that 
Congress validly exercised its section 5 power in Title II, as it applies 
to a state’s discrimination against inmates with disabilities, because 
 
834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987), in which a paraplegic inmate was “unable to access toilet 
facilities”; Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Kan. 1999), in which a double amputee 
was “forced to crawl around on jail floor”; and Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 1999), in 
which a deaf inmate was “denied access to sex-offender therapy program allegedly required as 
precondition for parole.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 525 n.11; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, 
at 30–31 (listing additional cases involving unconstitutional treatment of inmates with 
disabilities).  
 110. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 111. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 529. 
 112. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001) (“The ADA [imposes] an ‘undue 
burden’ upon the employer.”). But see Lane, 541 U.S. at 532 (articulating that the duty to 
accommodate is well established with respect to access to the courts). 
 113. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (“The unequal treatment of disabled person, in the 
administration of judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite several 
legislative efforts to remedy the problem of disability discrimination.”). 
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Title II’s duty to accommodate is consistent with the constitutional 
obligations imposed upon state prisons.114  
Title II is a congruent and proportional response to the history and 
pattern of discrimination in state penal systems because it addresses 
unconstitutional conduct while acknowledging the importance of 
security concerns.115 As the Court noted in Lane, Title II “does not 
require [s]tates to employ any and all means to make judicial services 
accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does not require States 
to compromise their essential eligibility criteria for public 
programs.”116 Instead, it prohibits the exclusion of a qualified 
individual from access to the courts solely by reason of their 
disability117 and requires that “reasonable modifications” be made to 
public services.118  
In the prison context, the flexibility of this requirement leaves 
room for necessary security measures. This alleviates the principle 
concern about additional regulation of prisons, and makes it more 
likely that the Court would view Title II as a valid abrogation of the 
Eleventh Amendment when applied to the overall administration of 
the prison. While the Supreme Court held in Goodman that Title II is 
valid in instances when its protections overlap with the Constitution, 
Title II should also be valid in its entire application in order to 
prevent unconstitutional conduct.119  
 
 114. See also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000) (“Difficult and 
intractable problems often require powerful remedies.”). Cf. Lane, 541 U.S. at 532.  
 115. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987) (proposing that constitutional rights 
within a prison may be infringed in furtherance of “goals of institutional security and safety”). 
 116. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531–32. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
 118. Id. § 12131(2); see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (“[M]ost offenders 
will eventually return to society, [so a] paramount objective of the corrections system is the 
rehabilitation of those committed to its custody.” (quotations omitted)). Therefore, providing 
inmates with access to programs, services, and activities available to other inmates is consistent 
with the goals of the penal system. 
 119. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2003) 
(“Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional 
conduct, in order to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct.”); City of Rome v. United 
States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (stating that practices that are not themselves unconstitutional 
may be prohibited in order to enforce constitutional guarantee). Title II would, for example, 
relieve an inmate of the burden of showing a particular mental state on the part of a prison 
official that he would have to show when proving “deliberate indifference” under the provisions 
of the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Title II regulates programs, services, and activities, but not 
punishment. However, every action of the prison is part of an 
inmate’s punishment. Like Title II’s application in the due process 
arena, it ensures that states provide certain constitutional minima. In 
order to do so, however, Title II must apply not only in instances 
where it intersects with constitutional rights, but in the broad sense 
that Congress intended.  
The fact that inmates with disabilities often suffer unduly in 
prison is unjust.120 The punishment of an inmate with a disability and 
of an average inmate for the same crime should be the same; and 
Title II could go a long way toward rectifying the present inequity. 
 
 120. See supra note 1. Certainly the suffering of disabled inmates beyond that of their 
fellow inmates is tragic, but our view of their position may be crafted in part out of our 
misunderstanding of how the criminal process functions. Professor Robert Cover asserts that 
violence underlies the American system of justice despite our desire to view it otherwise: 
“There is . . . a fundamental difference between the way in which ‘punishment’ operates as an 
ideology in popular or professional literature, in political debate, or in general discourse, and 
the way in which it operates in the context of the legal acts of trial, imposition of sentence, and 
execution.” Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1608–09 (1986). Title II 
represents an opportunity to move the realities of the incarceration of inmates with disabilities 
closer to this ideological view. 
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